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The problem: 
the relation between ME and NE
First-order questions concern what are the actual right actions to 
perform in a given situation and why. Second-order questions
concern what is actually happening in moral reasoning, what 
persons are doing when they engage in moral reasoning. 
In recent years, a general distrust towards metaethics has been raised:
• Unintelligibility
• Meaninglessness
• Metaethics simply is normative ethics
Ronald Dworkin: "there are no sensible independent, second-order, 
metaphysical questions about value"
Outline and general aim
1) The problem of quietism and its varieties
2) Metaethical quietism: rebutting Dworkin’s anti-
Archimedeanism
3) Philosophical quietism: Rawls and the “so what 
question”
4) Inescapable metaethical problems for political 
philosophers
→ Defeat quietism and arguing that, questions of 
political philosophy (at least, some of them) should 
be done with metaethics. Methodologically, 
metaethics cannot simply be ruled out.
The problem of quietism
A difficult definition: very different philosophical traditions and 
commitments. E.g. Blackburn, Rorty, Dworkin, McDowell, Putnam, 
the Positivists.
In Ethics:
a) Moral theories are not to touch upon any philosophical dispute 
and debate (Rawls)
b) Metaethics belongs to normative ethics, metaethical debates 
should be addressed by substantive theorizing (Dworkin)
↘The autonomy thesis: normative theories are independent from 
changes and developments in other fields
Confusion: metaethics, metaphysics, ontology.
Metaethical quietism
1) There is no metaethical grounding for normative 
ethics, thus morality is autonomous
2) We should give up on ontology and moral theories 
need to be metaphysically light
3) Moral philosophy is to provide normative judgments 
and practical solutions to moral problems
Dworkin: metaethics is Archimedean for it purports to 
“stand outside a whole body of belief, and to judge it 
as a whole from premises or attitudes that owe 
nothing to it.” 
→ Problem of skepticism
Dworkin’s two-stage argument
Dworkin’s hypothesis: metaethics is normative ethics
Claims are genuinely metaethical iff
(1) cannot be interpreted or translated into positive moral 
judgments
(2) can be shown to be philosophically distinct from substantive 
claims
Condition (1) is never met: metaethical  claims are emphasized 
versions of normative claims 
> abortion is objectively wrong = abortion is really wrong
Condition (2) is defeated by “there is no right answer to the 
question whether slavery is wrong” 
> it entails a substantive thesis about slavery
First Challenge
Is anti-Archimedeanism an Archimedean position about the 
relation between ME and NE?
Dworkin is judging metaethics from an external perspective 
holding that there is no Archimedean leverage> arguing 
against the possibility of metaethics is itself a 
metaethical position
Dworkin’s possible answers:
1) It is a metaethical position: self-refuting
2) It is not metaethical for metaethics does not exist: 
efficiency error
Second challenge
Consider: “there is a right answer to the question 
whether slavery is wrong”
 It is not a substantive claim for it implies both that 
slavery is wrong, nor that slavery is right: there is no 
prescription
 It asserts that there is an answer: a realist and a 
relativist would disagree, so it is not metaethically 
neutral, but distinguishes a genuine metaethical 
dispute > it is meaningful on its own
Third Challenge
Dworkin’s argument:
(1)If ME is neutral, then it is independent of NE
(2)ME is not neutral for it does not pass the test
(3)ME is not independent, so it is part of NE
(4)NE is independent of ME
Does non-neutrality imply dependence?
Does being dependent necessarily mean being a part of what is 
independent?
Neutrality = freestandingness?
→ ME may bring some N outcomes, but cannot settle normative 
controversy
Philosophical quietism
Rawls’s idea of PP in Political Liberalism is to propose a 
political conception independent of philosophy, 
metaethics, and substantive moral theories > a 
freestanding conception that can be justified without 
reference to controversial moral principles
It is not that metaethics is of no value per se. 
But, PP aiming at finding practical solution should avoid it.
ME is misplaced in PP, it is counter productive
→ Rorty: Stop the debate! For there is no practical benefit 
from philosophical debates
Is ME irrelevant for NE?
Answering the “so what question”: can ME be practically 
important and theoretically relevant for NE?
Disagreement about normative matters:
Different kinds of disagreement employ different standards 
and rules > disagreement about maths ≠ disagreement 
about the best female tennis player
→ Rules of judgments in moral disagreements are set by ME
Different perspectives in ME shape different understandings 
and dealings for the problem of disagreement > ME shows 
what is important for deliberation
Conclusions
(1) Dworkin’s argument about ME quietism is refuted
(2) I answered the “so what question”
(3) I provided some ground to resist the idea that ME 
should be methodologically ruled out
Should PP be done without metaethics?
There are some normative problems which 
benefit from metaethical understanding
